Medical Cannabis

Bedrocan: What Went Wrong? – The Founder’s Account

This is the second in a three-part series examining the various, conflicting accounts of Bedrocan’s bankruptcy declaration.

This is the second in a three-part series examining the various, conflicting accounts of Bedrocan’s bankruptcy declaration. The Health Minister Sophie Hermans’s account, and the initial findings of its administrators, are covered in Part 1 and Part 3.

Tjalling Erkelens, Bedrocan’s founder and former chairman of the board, submitted a factual rebuttal to the Standing Committee for Health, Welfare and Sport on November 16, together with a summary document and a proposed motion for the Tweede Kamer debate on November 26. 

The rebuttal runs to 11 pages and, in Appendix 1, sets out 13 proposed factual questions he invites MPs to put to the minister.

He told Business of Cannabis earlier this month: “A ministry is not well suited to [act] commercially in a pharmaceutical market. Do I blame them for it? I cannot blame them. It’s just incompetence. It’s incompetence that comes with that job because they are regulators. They are not salesmen.”

What caused the bankruptcy

Erkelens account points to a series of administrative decisions and acts by the Dutch state stretching back to 2022. The founder goes as far as calling it a ‘deliberate administrative sabotage’ and a ‘maladministration and administrative self-preservation at the ministry of VWS’.

He fiercely disputes the minister’s characterisation of the Bedrocan-State arrangement as a ‘service agreement’. The parties operated, he writes, under a framework agreement for the purchase and supply of medicinal cannabis, confirmed in the 2023 IGJ GMP audit report and in the trustees’ bankruptcy report. Under that framework, he argues, the BMC had a direct obligation to accept and pay for the batches it had ordered as the company’s sole legally permitted buyer. 

Under the terms of the commercial agreement, the BMC was the only legally permitted buyer of Bedrocan’s output. Bedrocan grew to its orders and was not permitted to grow or sell anything beyond its own requests. It then sold the product on to Dutch pharmacies and to export markets, Germany foremost among them. Bedrocan’s Dutch operations had no other customer and no independent route to market.

In October 2022 and February 2023, the BMC placed orders with Bedrocan totalling 3,890 kg across 69 batches. The scale of those orders anticipated a market expansion announced by then-Minister Ernst Kuipers in March 2023, which lifted the production and export ceilings that had previously capped BMC’s sales abroad. The orders reflected an assumption that German demand in particular would expand significantly in response.

Demand did expand. BfArM figures show total German imports of medicinal cannabis rose by approximately 35% in 2023. However, the state-run entity was unable to convert this demand into additional sales, Erkelens claims, seeing BMC sales to German pharmacies dive by nearly 70%. 

As such, the BMC ordered far more stock than it was able to sell. Under the contract, those unsold batches remained BMC’s property, but physically they sat in Bedrocan’s freezer storage, which Bedrocan was contractually obliged to keep to a maximum of two batches at any time. 

By the time the Health and Youth Care Inspectorate (IGJ) conducted a GMP audit of Bedrocan’s Emmeloord and Veendam facility on September 21, 2023, the freezers in Emmeloord held 37 batches. In Erkelens’s account, these were not Bedrocan’s unsold stock but BMC’s uncollected orders. The resulting regulatory dispute became known as the ‘freezer incident’ and is the event Erkelens says was later used to justify terminating Bedrocan’s contract from January 01, 2026.

Financial conduct

Its agreement also meant that the BMC was Bedrocan’s only source of revenue. Any dispute between the two parties over whether, when and how much it would pay for ordered stock was therefore existential for Bedrocan. Erkelens’s rebuttal sets out a sequence of events in which, he argues, the state used that structural position deliberately to cut off Bedrocan’s cash flow.

In November 2025, Erkelens writes, the two parties signed a settlement agreement (a Vaststellingsovereenkomst or VSO) which set out the legal and financial framework for their continued relationship through 2026. The agreement is confidential, so the specific sums and commitments cannot be published. Erkelens’s point is not what the VSO contains but that it exists. The Minister’s November 06 letter does not mention it. Erkelens is asking the Tweede Kamer to compel its disclosure under Article 68 of the Constitution.

In mid-September 2026, Bedrocan asked the BMC to pay an outstanding invoice of around €345,000 three weeks earlier than the contract required. It refused, and two weeks later also withheld two further invoices totalling approximately €372,000 for batches of product that had already been produced, delivered and passed quality control. 

The minister characterised Bedrocan’s September request as a plea for payment on ‘untested cannabis’. Erkelens states unequivocally that this is untrue and that the product had already been approved. Days later, Bedrocan filed for a suspension of payments.

During the suspension, the administrators attempted to put together a rescue plan with Rabobank, Bedrocan’s main pledgeholder. Rabobank agreed to continue financing the company on the condition that the BMC would have to guarantee it would pay in full for batches it had already ordered and that had passed quality control. 

The BMC refused and blocked alternative buyers whom the administrators proposed to purchase and pay for the same stock instead. With no route to financing, the administrators petitioned the court on October 07 to convert the suspension of payments into bankruptcy. 

Beyond the immediate collapse, Erkelens points to the Dutch state’s own financial record. The VWS Annual Report for 2024 shows that CIBG, the agency within VWS that houses the BMC, received €6.25m from the national budget as compensation for cannabis batches that had been written off, without placing any corresponding damage claim against Bedrocan on its balance sheet. 

The same Annual Report describes a separate 2024 purchase of €13m in cannabis as an ‘unlawful extension of an existing agreement’. CIBG’s equity rose to €15.6m over the period. Erkelens’s own estimate of the total cost to the Dutch taxpayer of the ministry’s handling of the file is between €8m and €9.5m.

Future supply and patient impact

The health ministers’ claims that patient supply is broadly safeguarded is directly challenged by Erkelens, who cites the CBG ‘Switching Unwanted’ policy of 2021, which advises against product-to-product switching for a range of medicines, including CBD oils, in treatment-resistant epilepsies. 

The second is a report from the Institute for Medicinal Cannabis (IMC) of October 2026, titled ‘Medicinal cannabis is not simply interchangeable’, which makes the same point on scientific grounds for Bedrolite specifically.

Since January 01, 2026, Dutch cultivation has operated under two regimes. Regime 1, the historic BMC monopoly for flower sold through pharmacies (Bedrocan’s old agreement, now ended), and Regime 2, a parallel route for cultivating raw material for licensed Dutch extract manufacturers. 

In September 2026, Bedrocan and the Dutch pharmaceutical manufacturer Cannadis Europe B.V. jointly applied to BMC for 250 to 500 kg of Regime 2 cannabis flos for extraction. BMC missed the eight-week statutory decision deadline and, on November 13, rejected the application on the ground that Cannadis could not trade extracts from cannabis not ‘cultivated on behalf of BMC’, a Regime 1 condition.

As such, the VWS in his account, is blocking a domestic restart and importing foreign supply to replace Bedrocan in the same breath.

What comes next?

Erkelens’s submission to the Tweede Kamer includes Appendix 1, which sets out 13 factual questions he invites MPs to put to the Minister, and Appendix 2, which sets out a proposed motion requesting the House to compel disclosure of the November 2025 VSO under Article 68 of the Constitution, and to secure active administrative cooperation on a workable transitional arrangement, including timely approval of Regime 2 agreements, so that a restart of cultivation and uninterrupted supply of Bedrolite to vulnerable patients can be guaranteed.

Erkelens concludes the rebuttal by submitting that the Minister’s ‘regrettable development’ framing is ‘completely untenable’, and that ‘what has transpired since 2023 testifies neither to mere business bad luck nor to regular enterprise risk, but to maladministration and administrative self-preservation at the Ministry of VWS’.

TopicsBedrocanBedroliteSophie HermansTjalling Erkelens

Ben Stevens

Ben is the editor of Business of Cannabis. Since 2021, he has researched, written, and published the vast majority of the outlet’s content, delivering agenda-setting journalism on regulation, business strategy, and policy across Europe.

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